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MEDIATION’S EFFECTS: TEST, DON’T GUESS 
By: 
James A. Wall & Kyle R. Holley 
 
 
As it glides down a broad valley, a river occasionally cuts a second channel, so that its 
water flows in parallel conduits. The second channel behaves in a manner quite different from 
the main artery (usually it runs faster) and it can modify the nature of the main river (decreasing 
its volume). Analogously, the civil court system has opened a second channel – mediation – in 
which the process/flow is quite different from that in the main civil-case channel. As such, the 
mediation channel is perhaps modifying the primary system. 
The literature convincingly indicates that the court system now has two channels – the 
trial route as well as mediation – and we will describe the mediation channel quite thoroughly. 
Specifically, we will delineate how the mediators, attorneys, and clients behave. Additionally, 
we will note the effects of the mediators’ strategies, the mediation outcomes, and how the 
mediators think. When describing the mediation channel, we will also point out how it differs 
from the main legal channel. For example, it is less formal, and at times there can be no 
agreement. 
Our description of the mediation channel will make up the bulk of the chapter, while the 
delineation of how mediation affects the main court system will be briefer as it is more 
challenging to construct. Consider now the mediation system. We first delineate its process and 
then will present the theoretical overview. 
 
 
Mediation Process 
 
In the mediations we observed, the mediator, plaintiff, defendant, and their attorneys met 
at an agreed-upon time and location. Typically, the mediator arrives first and when the other 
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parties arrive, the plaintiffs and their attorney are escorted to one room and the defendants and 
their attorney to another. 
Initially, the mediator goes to each room for introductions and then brings all parties 
together in a central room. This is the “joint” session. Here, the mediator thanks the disputants 
for their attendance, describes his background, discusses the value of mediation, and indicates 
how the mediation will be conducted. Next, the plaintiff attorney presents its case, the defense 
attorney does the same; questions are asked and answered. 
Ending the opening joint session, the mediator tells the plaintiffs and defendants to go to 
their respective rooms, and the mediation begins. The mediator usually meets privately with the 
plaintiffs, first. After a discussion and obtaining an opening demand, the mediator then ambles 
over to the defendant’s room. Here, he discusses the case, presents the plaintiff’s offer, and 
requests a counter offer. Thereafter, the mediator commutes between the plaintiff and 
defendant’s rooms until there is a settlement or firm deadlock. 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Having described the operational procedure of the mediation, we now turn to the 
theoretical framework (Figure 1). Here, we draw upon systems and control theory to note that 
mediation is a decision making process that operates in an environment. 
This institutional environment is the U.S. civil court system which can allow or require 
cases to be sent to mediation. The cases themselves are civil ones (e.g., automobile injuries, 
contract disputes, medical malpractice claims, personal injuries) rather than criminal. 
In addition to directing cases to mediation, the overall court system sets norms for all 
parties. The mediation is voluntary; therefore, the mediator can choose whether to accept the 
case. While in the mediation, disputants can, at any time, withdraw from the mediation. The 
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mediator is required to be neutral, cannot give legal advice, and cannot dictate an agreement. But 
the mediator does control the process. On the other side, the disputants are required to bargain in 
good faith, respect the law and mediator, and allow the mediator to control the process. 
Within the mediation are at least three decision makers: one mediator, and two or more 
disputants (e.g., plaintiffs, defendants, and attorneys). As depicted by control theory, the mediator 
has goals (e.g., agreement and disputant concessions) and compares them to the current state.     
If there is a discrepancy (e.g., no agreement), the mediator employs various techniques to 
improve the current state. 
 
The plaintiffs and defendants engage in parallel patterns of behavior. They also have 
goals (e.g., a large payment from the opponent) and compare them to the current state (e.g., a 
modest offer). When finding a discrepancy, the plaintiffs and defendants adopt tactics to modify 
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the current state. Typically, these behaviors entail comments to the mediator and messages or 
offers to the opponent. 
The interactive mediation process between the mediator, plaintiff, and defendant has 
potential consequences for parties not physically at the mediation but are affected by the 
deliberations (e.g., children in divorce mediations). As indicated in Figure 1, these outcomes feed 
back to affect the behavior of the interacting parties. For example, if a mediator’s pressing causes 
the disputants to leave the mediation and go to trial, then the mediator is apt to reduce the 
pressing. 
Research Strategy 
 
When studying civil case mediations, we utilize a process called triangulation, (Figure 2) 
which entails three components: literature reviews, interviews, and observations of mediations. 
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Reading and understanding the literature allows us to determine what is currently known about 
civil case mediation, such as what questions are important and which ones remain unanswered. 
The literature also indicates which testable hypotheses can be developed about behaviors and 
outcomes in the mediations. 
Interviews with attorneys, judges, and mediators allow us to describe mediations, to 
tentatively conclude what is known about the mediation process, and to develop testable 
hypotheses. Also, a comparison of the interview responses with the literature enables us to 
identify gaps and misperceptions in our knowledge. 
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Turning to our observations of actual mediations, this approach allows us to test 
hypotheses, answer questions about mediations, correct some misperceptions, and identify areas 
in which there is agreement among the literature, the interviews, and our observations. 
A few words about our observation approach: it was meticulous and rather unique. An 
observer accompanied the mediator through every phase of the mediation, starting with a 
discussion before the mediation and concluding with a post-mediation interview. In the pre- and 
post-mediation sessions, the observer recorded the mediators’ comments. In the joint and 
separate sessions, the observer recorded exactly what they parties said – in sequence – as well as 
the demands, concessions, and agreements. 
As the mediators moved from room to room, they were asked questions about their 
behavior as well as their thinking. Their responses were recorded accordingly. 
The disputants’ and mediators’ comments were subsequently coded by two raters using 
the categories in Tables 1 and 2. When differences occurred, the raters conferred at mutually 
acceptable classifications. 
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Table 1 
 
Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Techniques (Sample Listing) 
 
 
 
Technique Description 
 
 
Notes strength of own case Disputant strengthens own case or argues that it is 
strong. 
 
Indicates weakness of opponent’s case Weaknesses in the other’s case are cited or the 
other is claimed to be weak in some way. 
 
Notes relative advantage in trial Disputant indicates that it has an advantage or 
strength in the trial or with the judge, jury, location, 
etc. 
 
Gives information The disputant gives information to the mediator for 
the mediator or the other party. Includes stating 
one’s own preferences. 
 
Asks for information Disputant asks for information from the other 
disputant or the mediator. 
 
Weakens self Disputant cites or admits a weakness of its own. 
 
Criticizes other The disputant criticizes the other’s action, 
concession, attitude, posture, etc. 
 
Empathy/understanding for mediator Disputant expresses empathy or understanding for 
the mediator. 
 
Praise mediator Praise, compliments or nice statements about the 
mediator. 
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Table 2 
 
Mediators’ Techniques (Sample Listing) 
 
 
 
Techniques Description 
Points out weakness of disputant’s 
case 
The mediator weakens the disputants’ case, or mentions a 
weakness of the disputants’ case. 
 
Indicates strength of opponent’s case Mediator supports, strengthens or argues the case of the 
other disputant. Includes mentioning the other has a strong 
case. 
 
Notes costs and risks of trial for the 
disputant 
Mention of the risk or cost of trial to the disputant. Can 
entail mention of uncertainty and speculations of what the 
judge, arbitrator, or judge might do. Includes other’s 
advantage in trial. 
 
Asks for information Mediator collects or asks for information from the 
disputants, documents, or third parties. Includes having the 
disputants state their points of view. 
 
Weakens other Mediator mentions a weakness of the other disputant or 
weakens the other in some way. 
 
Criticizes disputant Mediator criticizes a disputants’ action, attitude, or person. 
 
Criticizes other Mediator criticizes or mentions a negative aspect of the 
other. 
 
Strengthens disputant The mediator supports, strengthens, or argues the case for the 
disputant. 
 
Shows empathy or understanding for 
disputant 
Mediator shows empathy or understanding for the disputant. 
Includes saying the other has this. 
 
 
 
 
Our analyses of the mediators’, plaintiffs’, and defendants’ statements, offers, 
concessions, agreements, and deadlocks allowed us to accurately describe the mediation process 
and determine the causal patterns within. 
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We can draw the following conclusions about civil case mediations based on the 
aforementioned observations, analyses, literature reviews, and interviews with mediators, judges, 
and attorneys. 
Research Results 
 
Goals. With regard to the mediators’ goals (Figure 1), our research indicates they are of 
 
two types: primary and operational. Primary goals are settlement of the case, as well as clients’ 
and attorneys’ satisfaction. Also, many mediators wish to attain repeat business. Turning to the 
operational goals – those that the mediators believe underpin the attainment of the primary goals 
– we found three: client control, reduced client and attorney aspirations, and the heightening of 
clients’ anxiety about trial. 
Of signal importance are the goals we found to be absent. No mediators mentioned 
transformation goals, that is, the goals of improving the relationship between the parties or 
improving the attorneys’ or clients’ negotiation skills. 
Finding no mention of these goals, we asked the mediators specifically if they pursued 
these objectives. Their responses across the board was, “No.” When asked why, they replied that 
the plaintiffs and defendants would likely not meet again so there was no reason to improve their 
relationships. While the attorneys might interact in the future, the mediators felt they were 
capable of maintaining an amicable working relationship. Therefore, there was no need to 
improve the relationship. 
As for improved negotiation skills, the mediators consistently held that attorneys had 
sufficient negotiation skills. Thus the mediators did not believe it was their responsibility to 
improve the skills of negotiation-challenged attorneys. 
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Mediators’ behaviors. With these primary and operational goals in their sights, mediators 
 
engage (Figure 1) in behaviors to accomplish them. The literature indicates that mediators have 
approximately one hundred techniques to choose from and researchers have conceptually – but 
not empirically – categorized them into about two-dozen strategic groups.1 
As the above statements imply, the literature describing the mediators’ behaviors is 
voluminous. Yet, our research indicates that much of the mediators’ behavior can be condensed 
to a vector of assertiveness. Some mediators are very assertive, attempting to press parties off 
positions, trying to reduce aspirations, emphasizing the risks of trial, or noting the strength of the 
opponent and the high cost of a trial. Other mediators are less assertive, allowing the parties to 
make their own calculations and chart their own courses. 
Mediation outcomes. What are the effects of the mediators’ behaviors? The literature on 
 
various types of mediation indicates that mediation leads to a high level of agreement as well as 
to a high level of participant satisfaction.2 This literature is consistent with our observational 
studies; however, the literature in general does not indicate which techniques are most effective. 
Rather, it reports that mediation results in a high agreement rate and disputant satisfaction. 
Which specific techniques are most effective? The quest for an answer reveals the value 
of triangulation. Our conversations with plaintiffs, defendants, attorneys, and judges revealed 
that most believed assertive mediator behavior engendered more agreements. Yet the mediators 
often cautioned that such assertiveness probably would lower parties’ satisfaction. 
Our research mirrors these thoughts. In an observational study of 100 mediations, we 
 
 
1 James A. Wall Jr. & Timothy C. Dunne, Mediation Research: A Current Review, 28 NEGOTIATION J. 217, 236 
(2012). 
 
2 James A. Wall Jr., Mediation: An Analysis, Review, and Proposed Research, 25 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 157 (1981); 
James A. Wall Jr. & Ann Lynn, Mediation: A Current Review, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 160 (1993); James A. Wall 
Jr., John B. Stark & Rhetta L. Standifer, Mediation: A Current Review and Theory Development, 45 J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 370 (2001); Wall & Dunne, supra note 1. 
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found that assertive mediators – those using an evaluative or pressing strategy – attained a higher 
rate of settlement (69% and 59%, respectively) than did those who employed a neutral strategy 
(28%). 
The evaluative and pressing strategies did result in lower party satisfaction (6.0 and 5.7, 
respectively on a 7-point scale) than did a neutral (6.2) strategy.3  Yet, as a comparison among 
the above numbers reveals, the difference in satisfaction was not as great as that for agreements. 
The literature, we find corroborates strongly with our interviews and our observational 
studies. As Figure 3 reveals, the literature from studies of mediations in very diverse fields 
indicate that mediator assertiveness is strongly associated with disputant agreement. 
Only one study found that assertiveness hinders agreement. Note also that only two studies 
indicate that assertiveness reduces disputants’ satisfaction.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 James A. Wall Jr., Timothy C. Dunne & Suzanne Chan-Serafin, The Effects of Neutral, Evaluative, and Pressing 
Mediator Strategies, 29 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 127 (2011). 
 
4  Id.; Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from Empirical 
Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641, 684-85 (2002). 
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Mediation Outcomes versus Trial Outcomes 
 
The preceding discussion of the mediation outcomes – and the mediator behaviors that 
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spawned them – brings us to a pivotal question. How do the mediation outcomes compare to the 
outcomes in the regular legal system? Specifically, 
1.   Are mediations quicker? 
 
2.   Are mediations less costly? 
 
3.   Are there more settlements in mediation than in the central legal system (i.e., trial)? 
 
4.   Are clients more pleased with mediation than with trials? 
 
The first two questions can be answered affirmatively. While no empirical studies have 
focused specifically on these queries, reports from attorneys, judges, and clients, as well as 
opinions voiced in the literature, report mediation is more expedient and less costly than trials. 
Such reports correlate quite well with simple reasoning. 
Consider first, speed. Based on our observations and discussions with mediators, the 
average civil case mediation requires less than eight hours. Probably, the same case, with jury 
selection, opening statements, evidence presentation, statements by parties, cross-examinations, 
jury deliberations, etc. will take at least three days in trial. 
Turning to cost, (question 2) we again can make some rudimentary comparative 
calculations. The mediation costs below were based on discussions with mediators we have 
observed and interacted with over the years. For an average case, the mediation costs would be 
approximately: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(These costs do not include depositions, preparation costs, etc., which would occur in the 
Administrative fee $400 
8 hours, mediator costs $3,200 
8 hours, defense attorney costs $2,000 
8 hours, plaintiff attorney costs $2,000 
Value of plaintiff’s time $800 
Value of defendant’s time $800 
Total $11,200 
 
130   
mediation or the trial.) 
 
For the trial, the costs would be at least: 
 
Court fees $300 
3 days defense attorney costs $6,000 
3 days plaintiff attorney costs $6,000 
Value of plaintiff’s time $2,400 
Value of defendant’s time $2,400 
Total $17,200 
 
Admittedly, these are rough estimates, but they make the point that trials – because they require 
more time – are more expensive than mediation. If some readers disagree, we encourage them to 
pose a case in which the mediation costs more than a trial. 
Moving to the next two questions – are there more settlements in mediation, and are 
clients more pleased with mediation? – the answer to both is that we do not know. 
To ferret out the answers we need to conduct some studies; that is, we should test, not 
guess. Consider question 3, Are there more settlements in mediation – that is, a higher 
percentage of settlements – than in the cases that remain in the regular court system. Since 
mediations have a settlement rate of roughly 70%, one’s initial answer is affirmative. Yet, we 
know that only about 2% of the filed cases in the legal system go to trial. So now we are not so 
sure. We need to gather some data to answer this question. 
Study 1, depicted in Figure 4, is a simple one designed to answer this question. 
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 Study 1  
Year   Not Mediated    Mediated  
 Cases Cases Cases Cases Settled/ Cases Cases Cases Cases Settled/ 
 Filed Scheduled Settled Cases Scheduled Filed Scheduled Settled Cases Scheduled 
  For Trial Before Trial 
For Trial  For Trial Before Trial 
For Trial 
 
2010 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
% 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
% 
2011 x x x % x x x % 
2012 x x x % x x x % 
2013 x x x % x x x % 
2014 x x x % x x x % 
2015 x x x % x x x % 
2016 x x x % x x x % 
2017 x x x % x x x % 
2018 x x x % x x x % 
2019 x x x % x x x % 
2020 x x x % x x x % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It entails tracking filed cases that do not go to mediation versus those which do. Researchers 
would look at the number of cases filed in each year, the number scheduled for trial, and those 
settled before trial. The percentage of the trial-scheduled cases which settled in the non-mediated 
channel (Column 5) versus the percentage of trial-scheduled cases which settled in the mediation 
channel (Column 9) would answer the question: Are there a higher percentage of settlements in 
mediated versus non-mediated cases? 
For the question, “Are clients more pleased in mediated cases than in those which do not 
go to mediation?” the study (as shown in Figure 5) is less arduous to conduct. 
 
Figure 4 
Study 1 
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Not 
Settled 
  
 
 
Dependent	  Variable	  
- Clients’ satisfaction 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
Study 2 
 
In Study 2, researchers could interview clients (and perhaps attorneys) after the cases were 
mediated, after non-mediated cases were settled, or after non-mediated cases went through in 
trial. During the interview (or surveys) they could measure the parties’ satisfaction with the 
procedure. Subsequently, the responses in the three conditions could be compared to determine if 
clients are more pleased with mediation over trials, or if they are more pleased with mediation 
than in cases that settled without mediation. This study would also allow researchers to 
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determine if clients are more satisfied in mediations that settled than in those where there is not 
settlement. 
The Effect of Mediation on the Legal System 
 
To this point, we have said the civil court system has opened a second channel to handle 
mediation cases. In the mediations, the mediator interacts with the parties and when doing so has 
goals that are pursued. The mediators’ behaviors are generally effective, resulting in a high level 
of agreement and satisfaction, as well as in lower costs and speedier handling of the cases. The 
most effective mediator behaviors appear to be assertive ones, in that they significantly increase 
agreements, with a somewhat minor decrease in satisfaction. It appears rather evident that 
mediations are quicker than trials and less costly. With regard to the number of settlements, we 
know the settlement rate in mediations is high but we do not know if it is higher than for non- 
mediated cases. We need a study to answer this question. 
Also, we know that clients and attorneys are quite satisfied with mediation; however, we 
do not know if their satisfaction in mediated cases is higher than for cases that are not mediated. 
Another study is called for to answer this question. 
Having established that mediation is working rather well, we can turn to its effect on the 
regular legal system. 
When we asked mediators, judges, and attorneys about this effect, the predominant 
answer was mediation reduces the number of cases that must be tried in the regular system. In 
the literature we also find such opinions but very little hard evidence and a high level of 
variance.5 Some attorneys say a large percentage of their cases go to mediation, while others 
 
 
5 Janine Robben, Oregon’s Vanishing Civil Jury Trial: A Treasured Right, or a Relic?, OR. ST. B. BULL. (Nov.   
2009) available at http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/09nov/jurytrial.html; Teresa G. Campbell & Sharon L. 
Pizzuti, The Effectiveness of Case Evaluation and Mediation in Michigan Circuit Courts, REP. TO THE ST. CT. 
ADMIN. OFF., MICH. SUP. CT. (Oct. 31, 2011), 
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hold that very few do so. 
 
When we examine the hard data, we conclude that mediation is probably not having a 
significant impact, nation-wide, on the number of cases going to trial. Consider that in 2012, 
there were 303,820 civil filings in U.S. district courts6 and 15,883,105 in state courts.7 The total 
is about 16 million. As for the number of mediations in the U.S., there is no overall report and 
the best guess we can locate is 250,000.8 
To us, it seems impossible that this small number of mediations is having a significant 
impact upon the number of trials in the overall system. To test this conclusion and provide data to 
resolve this issue, we propose a simple study. As depicted in Figure 6, Study 3 would 
measure/record the number of civil cases filed, civil trials, and mediations over a set number of 
years. A simple comparison between the number of mediations and the number of civil cases (via 
some lagged correlations) would allow researchers to determine if mediation were reducing the 
number of trials. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://courts.mi.gov/Administration/SCAO/Resources/Documents/Publications/Reports/The%20Effectiveness%20of 
%20Case%20Evaluation%20and%20Mediation%20in%20MI%20Circuit%20Courts.pdf;   Richard   G.   Spier,  
Remarks at the Oregon Law Institute CLE on Mediation Tools and Techniques for Lawyers: Is mediation overused? 
(Oct. 19, 2012) (article available at http://www.mediate.com/articles/SpierR3.cfm). 
 
6 Federal Judicial Case Load Statistics 2014 Tables – US District Courts - Civil, (March 31, 2014), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2014-tables 
 
7 Civil Case Load, Court Statistic Project, http://www.courtstatistics.org/civil.aspx. 
 
8  James A. Wall Jr. & Suzanne Chan-Serafin, Civil Case Mediations: Some Observations and Conclusions, THE 
JURY EXPERT  5, 5 (Sept. 2009), http://www.thejuryexpert.com/wp-content/uploads/WallChan- 
SerifinTJESep2009Volume21No5.pdf. 
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Year 
 
2010 
Civil Cases Filed 
 
x 
Civil Case Trials 
 
x 
Mediations 
 
x 
2011 x x x 
2012 x x x 
2013 x x x 
2014 x x x 
2015 x x x 
2016 x x x 
2017 x x x 
2018 x x x 
2019 x x x 
2020 x x x 
 
 
 
A second question concerning the effect of mediation on the overall legal system is, 
“Does mediation reduce the time between filing of cases and their resolution?” Here again, we 
believe there is not a significant effect because there are very few mediations relative to the 
number of filed civil cases. However, a test of this query is simple to propose but rather difficult 
to conduct (Figure 7). 
In such an investigation – Study 4 – researchers would record the mediations over a 
number of years as well as the time between the filing of a case and its resolution in trial. A 
comparison between these figures (probably with a lagged correlation) would answer our 
question. 
 
 
Study 3 
 
 
Figure 6 
Study 3 
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Study	  4	  
	  
	  
Year Mediations  Time Between Filing and Resolution in Trial 
 
2010 x x 
 
2011 x x 
 
2012 x x 
 
2013 x x 
 
2014 x x 
 
2015 x x 
 
2016 x x 
 
2017 x x 
 
2018 x x 
 
2019 x x 
 
2020 x x 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
Study 4 
A final and most interesting question as to the effect of mediation on the overall legal 
system is, “Does mediation improve the clients’ evaluation of the legal system?” 
Many of the mediators we interviewed and observed stated that one of their goals was to 
improve this evaluation, and they felt their mediation behavior accomplished this goal. Are these 
mediators correct? Is the evaluation of the legal system more positive for plaintiffs and 
defendants who go through mediation versus those who do not? 
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The literature and our studies do imply this is the case. Together, they indicate that 
disputants are generally satisfied with mediation, and it therefore seems logical to assume that 
their satisfaction with the mediation would be extrapolated to a positive evaluation of the overall 
legal system. 
This effect, however, may not be a strong one, because mediators in their joint sessions 
and caucuses tend to deride the legal system. Specifically, they hold that trials are time 
consuming, costly, risky, controlled by strangers, and occasionally very unfair. Such denigration 
perhaps reduces the clients’ positive extrapolations. 
This deductive background sets the stage for a simple study to test for the positive effect. 
 
In it, researchers can ask plaintiffs and defendants who utilized mediation how satisfied they 
were with the procedure. Their responses can, in turn, be compared to those of disputants who 
went to trial (without previously utilizing mediation). 
A related and important question is whether or not mediation raises the general public’s 
evaluation of the overall legal system. We think not, and advise that the question not be tested. 
Our reasoning is that the number of parties utilizing mediation – percentage wise – is quite small 
and therefore the chances of their positive evaluation propagating the legal system or the public’s 
attitudes is miniscule. 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 
When we examine and reflect upon the two channels of the legal system, we can conclude 
mediation is flowing quite well. Cases which enter mediation are handled expeditiously; 
therefore, there is less delay and expense than in trials. In the mediations, mediators              
utilize a wide variety of techniques and those mediators who are more assertive tend to produce   
a higher level of agreements. Overall, mediators attain settlements about 70% of the 
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time, and disputants tend to be very satisfied with the process. 
 
In this mediation channel, there are a couple of questions that need to be tested. Namely, 
is there a higher percentage of settlements in mediations than in the overall legal system, and is 
there a higher level of client satisfaction in mediation than in trials? We have proposed studies to 
answer these two questions. 
When we consider the effect of mediation on the overall court system, we have more 
questions than answers. Mediation does reduce the number of cases that go to trial, and it 
probably does expedite cases that go to trial after mediation. However, mediation it seems does 
not significantly reduce the number of cases going to trial. This short hypothesis needs to be 
tested, and we propose a study to do so. 
Another question that merits research is whether or not mediation reduces the time 
between the filing of cases in the overall legal system and their resolution. 
Finally, we ask if mediation improves the clients’ evaluation of the legal system. We 
believe that it does; yet, this hypothesis should be tested. As to whether or not mediation 
improves the general public’s view of the legal system, we hold that it does not. And the 
conclusion seems so self-evident that it merits no test. 
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